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Peacetime operations that can be observed stimulate little
of the activity that can be expected in crises or wartime, and
fleet exercises that offer an opportunity to observe combat
direction offer little opportunity to observe higher level
command functions in a realistically stimulated environment
(Ketron, Inc. 1979, p. 4). Before Desert Storm, many weapons,
systems, and ideas were untested in combat. The Navy cannot
rely on actual conflict for evaluating its combat
capabilities. Wargaming used as a tool in research,
operational planning, and training is rapidly expanding to
meet these needs.
Improvements will be needed to adapt existing systems and
technology and to make limited upgrades and changes in a
number of areas, including, the following: .. .Simulation-
gaming support to assist in near real-time analysis of
alternative courses of action and for peacetime training
and readiness.... (Command and Control Functional
Analysis and Consolidation Review Panel Report, 1991, p.
7)
Interest in improving the Navy command, control and
communication (C3) systems has been encouraged by the
Department of Defense in recent years for several reasons.
The threat to Naval forces continues to become more
complicated due to complex, multi-dimensional anti-ship
missiles deployed on aircraft, ships, and submarines, and
increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare technology.
There has been an exponential growth in the amount of
information available to commanders for assessing the
situation and operational planning. Rapid advances in
computer and communications technologies have enabled the
planning and design of increasingly sophisticated systems to
support tactical C3.
Modeling, simulation and gaming can effectively be used
for identifying requirements and designing, developing,
acquiring, training for and employing major C3 systems.
Command and control of military forces and assets is
ultimately a human decision process supported by C3 systems
with human operators receiving imperfect information. The
most effective and economical way to evaluate systems
involving human processes is by using wargaming. In
particular, wargaming best supports research for the following
command and control functions: situation monitoring, decision
making, and management of forces and intelligence support
assets.
The first step in command and control research (C2R)
focuses on decisions critical to military operations, the
two most important being to identify decisions that have
an impact on combat outcome; and to identify the
appropriate command levels where different decisions are
most appropriate. Once the crucial decisions are
identified, C2R then encompasses many issues, including
identifying information required to make the best
decisions and the effect of time on the information
gathering and dissemination process. (Hogan and Might,
1988, p. 33)
Navy officers need to be aware of the benefits and hazards
of using wargaming for research, operational planning and
training. Decision makers, who have not been involved in
wargaming, can expect to deal with games or the results of
games in the course of their careers. Wargame use is as
complex as the situations they attempt to address.
The fact is that wargames and wargaming are consistently
misunderstood, denigrated, even denounced, not only by
gaming outsiders, but also by gaming proponents and
practitioners. This unfortunate situation is a result of
a failure to reconcile the fundamental ambiguities of
wargaming, to understand the nature of the tool - the game
- and of the process of using it - gaming. (Perla, 1990,
p. 2)
In addition to limitations inherent in the games, game
data users need to question and understand the process of
applying a wargame to an experiment. An example of wargame
abuse is the wargame that was conducted in the spring of 1942
at the War College in Tokyo. Japanese naval planners were
preparing plans for the capture of Midway and the western
Aleutians in early June, the seizure of strategic points in
New Caledonia and the Fiji Islands in July, air strikes on
southeast Australia, and operations against Johnston Island
and Hawaii in August.
During the play the Nagumo Force was attacked by land-
based air while its own planes were attacking Midway.
Following the rules of the game, an umpire determined
that the carriers received nine hits and that two of
them, the Akagi and Kaga, were sunk. Rear Admiral
Ugaki, the director of the game, arbitrarily reduced
the number of hits to three, and the number of
sinkings to one, and then permitted the sunken carrier
to participate in the next part of the play dealing
with the New Caledonia and Fiji Island invasions.
(McHugh, 1966, p. 2-19)
Wargaming and model use will continue to grow in
importance as funding is reduced and the need for analysis
tools increases. Wargame adaptability uniquely applies to the
ever expanding and diverse third-world military scenarios, the
continuous redrawing of global country boundaries, and unique
combinations of our own forces.
B. PURPOSE AND GOALS
The principal purpose of this thesis is to provide
information about wargaming to prospective users. The first
component is wargaming in general. The goal is to provide the
reader with limitations that need to be considered and hazards
that must be avoided when using conclusions derived from
wargame data. The thesis contains a description of wargame
features and a discussion concerning wargame limitations and
hazards. The second component is how to design a wargame
experiment to support C3 hypotheses testing. The goal is to
enable the reader to test C3 hypotheses using a wargame
experiment by providing a guide. A general description of the
steps in planning a general wargame experiment is provided,
including detailed information on wargame software
considerations. A synopsis followed by a critique of an
actual C3 wargame experiment is furnished apply the principles
supported in this thesis.
C. ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE
This thesis is an implementation guide. Chapter I
provides the reader with a background on why wargaming is
advantageous for research and will be even more useful in the
future. It also includes the thesis purpose, goals, and
organization. Chapter II goes into more detail on C3 wargame
applications, types, features and basic requirements. Chapter
III describes the limitations inherent to wargaming and
hazards to avoid in wargame use. Chapter IV guides the reader
through the steps for a general experiment design, including
detailed information on the critical stage of software
selection. Chapter V provides a synopsis of an actual C3
experiment that used a wargame to evaluate a decision aid.
Then the example is critiqued to apply the principles given in
this thesis. The final chapter is a summary.
II. WARGAMING DESCRIPTION
Before going into the specifics of wargaming
considerations and experiment design, this chapter ensures
that the reader understands the author's idea of what a
wargame is, some general and C3 wargame applications, the
types of wargames, and common features and basic requirements
of a wargame.
A. DEFINITIONS
In order to begin with a common understanding of terms
used in this thesis, the following definitions apply.
• Models are simplified approximations of reality. A model
is a representation of an object or structure, or an
explanation or description of a system, a process, or a
series of related events (McHugh, 1966, p. 1-4). The
amount of detail and variables in a model can vary to fit
its use. Some models look like what they represent, some
are similar and some are symbolic.
• A wargame is a theoretical representation, in accordance
with predetermined rules, data, and procedures, of
selected aspects of a conflict situation or military
operation. A gaming exercise employs human beings acting
as themselves or playing simulated roles in an environment
which is either actual or simulated (PACER Systems, Inc,
1975, p. 11)
.
• A simulation is an operating representation of selected
features of real-world or hypothetical events and
processes (McHugh, 1966, p. 1-1). All-machine simulations
(no human decision making) are not defined as games. All
games however, are simulations.
There is a distinct difference between a simulation and a
wargame that needs to be understood for C2 applications.
In simulations, explicit rules and procedures within the
simulation help define available choices and decisions.
Conversely, in war games, players interactively make the
pivotal decisions and choices. In this context, war games
are simulations with participatory user interaction.
(Airpower Research Institute, 1985, p. 3)
Use of strictly simulation is not recommended for C2
hypothesis testing experiments because human impacts and
dimensions are not easily duplicated by a computer program.
In model building, C3I is generally recognized as one of
the most difficult areas to portray. Within the open
simulation (man-in-the-loop) framework, some of the burden
is removed from the model designer when the decision is
made to allow the player to perform the command and
control (C2) functions directly. The remaining processes,
intelligence and communications, are somewhat more
mechanical and, therefore, simpler to represent in a
rational fashion. (National Defense University, 1986,
Volume I, p. IX- 1)
In addition to understanding what wargaming is, it is also
useful to understand what wargaming is not. Wargaming is not
a technique for producing a rigorous, quantitative or logical
dissection of a problem or for defining precise measures of
effectiveness by which to compare alternative solutions
(Perla, 1990, p. 164). Wargaming is not real. The level of
abstraction depends on the model and the application. A
wargame is not duplicable. The interplay of human decisions
affects the simulated outcomes and therefore, does not allow
the researcher to expect the same sequence of decisions and
outcomes during a replay of a game. Wargame designers and
analysts involved in research need to be careful to define the
results of a wargame in terms of why and issues raised, not
what happened. A game should not be used to predict outcomes.
They are best used to investigate processes.
B. GENERAL WARGAME APPLICATIONS
This section discusses why professional wargames are
played in addition to its traditional use for training. Some
of the added applications for wargames are to investigate not
rigorously quantifiable problems, decompose complex problems,
uncover new aspects of a problem, test operational plans,
assist in the planning process, and focus on human behavior.
1. Explore Not Rigorously Quantifiable Problems
For this type problem, the choice of which variables
form the basis of a problem and the relationships of the
variables are not easily determined. An example of a not
rigorously quantifiable problem is determining the United
States strategic forces necessary to deter nuclear war. A
rigorously quantifiable problem would be determining the
impact point of a bomb dropped by an aircraft. Selecting an
output measure, determining relevant variables, and defining
the underlying model is much more difficult in solving a not
rigorously quantifiable problem. Wargames represent the only
formal decision aid available for this type of problem.
2 . Decompose Complex Problems
Another application is to use a wargame as a tool for
decomposing complex problems. Proper game preparation forces
a consideration of the range of possibilities for any
assumption. This step provides a natural method for
subdividing a problem into smaller parts. With wargaming
experiments, one assumption at a time can be manipulated to
examine its impact on the problem. The decomposition of a
complex problem into separate models, each of which can be
evaluated and the results later combined, is an aid to
exploring a complex problem. However, caution should be
applied when making the final combination.
3 . Uncover New Aspects
Wargaming can be a form of brainstorming to generate
aspects of a situation that are not readily apparent. By role
playing in a realistic game, participants involved in a
complex scenario can explore alternative policies, discover
unexpected alternatives, and sometimes, anticipate outcomes
that differ from those originally envisioned (Airpower
Research Institute, 1985, p. 44). This approach can be used
in research to generate and test hypothesis concerning human
interactions.
4. Test Operational Plans
Another use of wargaming is testing operational plans.
The experiment requires a realistic model in order to apply a
real-world situation that requires planning a complex sequence
of actions. Insights may be gained as to how the plan will
work in the real world by playing out the planned actions. If
the initial design of a game incorporates well-known critical
factors into its models and procedures, the play of the game
and the questions and issues it raises can lead to the
discovery of other factors whose importance may have been
previously unsuspected or undervalued (Perla, 1990, p. 181).
The reader is reminded that insights not predictions of
possible outcomes will be generated.
5. Assist in Planning Process
Since a wargame can be used to evaluate a plan, it can
also be used to integrate plan evaluation into the planning
process. First a plan is gamed and evaluated, then any
deficiencies can be corrected in the next iteration. The idea
is to create a planning, testing, and replanning cycle. The
more complex the situation and therefore the plan, the more
useful and practical is the wargaming application. The design
of the game (organizing) , and the play and subsequent analysis
of the game (exploring) form a circular chain or feedback
loop, in which the questions and issues arising from one play
of the game can reshape or reorganize the game system itself
to make it a more accurate representation of reality (Perla,
1990, p. 180).
6. Focus on Human Behavior
Wargames allow the researcher to focus on human
behavior, specifically on human decision making. The models
usually offer various outcomes based on a probability
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distribution. Thus, the "roll of the dice" provides a wide
range of possible results or snapshots of reality with which
the players must deal (Perla, 1990, p. 276). The value of
wargaming for decision making is in qualitative assessments of
why decisions are made. The advantage of a wargame over an
exercise is that in an exercise there are limits on the range
of physical parameters and processes and on the range of
potential decision choices participants can choose from.
C. C2 WARGAME APPLICATIONS
In model building, C3 is recognized as one of the most
difficult areas to represent. Because wargaming uses a man-
in-the-loop framework, some of the complexity in model
building is reduced by allowing the player to perform the
command and control (C2) functions directly. The
communications function is more mechanical and can be simpler
to represent in the model.
There are at least four aspects of command and control
activities and processes that can be approximated in wargames
because they are characteristics that can be represented
realistically enough in the games to support meaningful
analysis. These aspects are:
• Command roles. Decision making functions and the nature
and scope of the force actions that result from the
decision making responsibility are defined by doctrine and
convention so there should be very little discrepancy
between command roles in reality and those for a game.
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• Hypothesis formation. Any time that decisions must be
made in the face of uncertainty and incomplete
information, the decision maker must construct from
available information hypotheses as to the nature of
events, situations, etc., about which he has no knowledge
and make decisions as if those hypotheses were true
(Ketron, Inc., 1979, p. 26). This holds true for gaming
if the decision makers are playing a similar game role as
the role they hold in reality.
• Filtering and interpretation of information. The way a
commander identifies items relevant to a decision by
filtering the constant stream of information against his
hypothesis to arrive at a decision is realistic in a
wargame if the actual information that the decision maker
is filtering and interpreting is realistic in format,
content, and order of arrival.
• Information categories. Given that the information that
is provided is tactically realistic, and that the roles
and reasoning just discussed reflect those which would be
encountered in the real world, the requests for
information to support command decision making should also
be representative of real world operations (Ketron, Inc.,
1979, p. 27) .
These aspects focus on the exercise of decision making along
the chain of command and are more dependent on the human
element of C3.
D. TYPES OF WARGAMES
Wargames can be classified in many and multiple ways. The
following gives a definition for classification by technique
of rule application, wargame purpose, and geographic scope and
decision making level.
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1. Classified by Technique
The two techniques of applying rules are rigid games
and free games. A technique choice for knowledge about the
opponent's forces is open or closed games.
Rigid games are conducted by following detailed,
nondeviating rules. The game rules usually provide for chance
events; the role and the range of chance results are not left
to the judgment of an umpire or controller (Hausrath, 1971,
pg. 123). All possible outcomes are predetermined and rules
provide for one possible outcome for each possible result of
chance. For example, if there is a 50:50 chance of either of
two outcomes, the rules determine how the result will be
resolved such as a coin toss. Rigid games have extensive
rules and are more complex to write for computer simulation.
Rules provide for identical procedures, methods, and source
data in each run and therefore are believed to provide more
consistent and reliable data.
A free game is conducted with fewer fixed rules and
the assessments are made by an umpire or controller. The
controller bases judgments on military experience. It is less
tied to the mechanics of play and is therefore, less reliable
than a rigid game and is usually more applicable to training
use.
The open game is simple and informal. The opposing
players have full knowledge of the positions and actions of
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their own and their enemy's forces so there is no need for an
intelligence model. The open game is most often used for
training.
The closed game is more complex and formal. Each team
has first hand knowledge only of their own forces and partial
knowledge of the opposing team is received by an intelligence
model. The closed game more closely approximates reality and
is more useful in command and control hypothesis testing.
2. Classified by Purpose
When the primary purpose of a wargame is to provide
the players with decision making experience, the game is
educational. When a game is conducted in an attempt to obtain
information and data that will help the responsible commander
to make decisions, the game is an operational planning type.
If the purpose is hypothesis testing, the game is an
experiment for research.
3. Classified by Level
This categorization combines geographic scope and the
level of decision making. The three levels are :
global/strategic, theater/operational, and local/tactical.
In global/strategic games, the participants are top
level decision makers, and the goal is to improve their
perspective, test strategies, and identify important issues at
that level. The primary output of these high-level games is
qualitative, consisting typically of game narratives with some
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interpretations of events and little numerical data (Perla,
1990, p. 170) .
Commanders in chief of the unified or specified
commands are the primary decision makers for the
theater/operational level wargame. These games are designed
to explore specific issues and identify strategic,
operational, and tactical problems with the theater scope.
The output is usually similar to that obtained for
global/strategic games however, theater/operational games more
often run the game more than once with the same players to
generate more numerical data.
The primary decision makers in the local/tactical
category are usually battle-group commanders or below. These
games focus attention on force levels and tactical
deployments, weapon and sensor performance, and
interrelationships among various warfare areas. The outputs
are a combination of qualitative and quantitative with more
numerical data than the other game categories. The number of
times the game is run with the same players tends to be
higher.
E. COMMON FEATURES OF WARGAMES
The following basic characteristics are present in all
wargames.
• Simulates a military operation.
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• Is usually at least a two-sided representation of forces
opposed to each other.
• Is conducted in accordance with data, rules, and
procedures that conform to accepted military doctrine.
• Represents an actual or predicted real-life situation.
• Provides for the employment and tactical movements of
units in each force.
• Uses some graphic means of identifying units, weapons, and
positions of forces.
• Provide a system for taking into account the firepower and
other capabilities of the forces and equipment involved
and a means for assessing the effects of combat.
• Includes a clash of opposing forces in fire fights,
battles, or prolonged campaigns. (Hausrath, 1971, p. 11)
and (McHugh, 1966, p. 1-12)
A wargame played for logistic requirement determination would
have exceptions to the above list of characteristics.
F. BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR WARGAMES
The following is a list of the basic requirements that are
common to all wargame applications. These requirements need
to be determined early and include: personnel; facilities and
equipment; rules, data and procedures; and a scenario.
1. Personnel
Because wargaming involves humans in the decision
process, an especially important requirement is knowledgeable
personnel. For C3 experiments, it is critical that the
players be highly qualified and be assigned to positions
appropriate to their experience and training. The game
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designers and analysts should be militarily knowledgeable and
have the required mathematical, statistical, and related
technological knowledge and skills.
These scientists must translate military characteristics
and actions into models and data that may be recorded and
tabulated. They must then compute the interactions. They
must assure that chance events and results are treated in
a sound mathematical and statistical manner to represent
realistic probabilities. In supervising the recording and
processing of game data, and in the interpretation of
results, proper allowance must be made for the effect of
assumptions, approximations, and change results. All
elements must be managed within the limits of reliability
imposed by the original input data and data-processing
methods. (Hausrath, 1971, p. 84)
Most games currently in use are played on computers. Some
members of the team of designers and analysts must be skilled
in designing and programming, modifying, and troubleshooting
the models processed in the computer; the supervision of the
computer input preparation; and the interpretation of computer
outputs.
2. Facilities and Equipment
The complexity of gaming facilities and equipment has
grown with technology. In the 1800 's games were played with
physical pieces representing equipment and units, now games
are usually played on interacting computers with display
monitors. Facilities usually consist of two or three
adjoining rooms, each having access to a connecting corridor.
3. Standard Rules, Data, and Procedures
Standard rules, data, and procedures are provided in
the form of a game manual or handbook. Also a set of
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reference data such as the weapon capabilities and the
quantities of each weapon available on each unit is required.
4. Scenario
A statement of the situation is required for the
initiating and conducting of any game. It may be a briefing
and/or a detailed game directive. The statement of the
situation must include all the "givens" for the game.
These "givens" include a statement of the geographic
locale, the forces and weapons available to each side, the
time frame in which the action is set, and the political
and other constraints applicable to the game. Also,
"givens" customarily include a resume of the conditions
leading to and resulting in the initiation of conflict,
the starting deployment of forces involved, and, above
all, orders or instructions to each commander stating the
purpose and objectives of the game, his special mission,
and related details. (Hausrath, 1971, p. 84)
This chapter has defined the difference between a
simulation and a wargame, wargame applications other than
training and logistics, and some common features and basic
requirements of all wargames. The next chapter addresses the




Wargames and the conclusions derived from wargaming are
often misunderstood, criticized, and even opposed. This
circumstance has resulted from a misunderstanding concerning
the nature of wargaming. When its limitations are understood
and hazards are avoided, wargaming is a very valuable tool.
A. LIMITATIONS
It is critical for the wargame researcher and data user to
fully comprehend the limitations inherent to any wargame.
These handicaps can only be mitigated and not negated.
However once their effects are understood, wargaming is very
useful for valid experimental testing.
1. Reality vs. Complexity
Wargame designers tackle a built in conflict when
trying to balance realism versus playability (detail versus
simplicity) . The difficulty is in designing symmetry between
the game system and the game player. If the game system
becomes too complex when the designer attempts to accurately
duplicate realism, the player's behavior may become unnatural.
A complicated game system can artificially slow the players
reactions to the game and make them more concerned with the
mechanics of the game. However, over simplistic game systems
19
do not challenge the players and will not encourage decisions
more like those made in a real situation.
The key to realistic wargaming lies in balancing the
player's experience in his decision making role with
as accurate a representation as possible of the
physical outcomes of his own decisions, his opponents
decisions, and the objective dynamics of combat.
Achieving this balance is difficult because realistic
decision making requires giving the player realistic
information and accurately representing the realistic
effects of time. (Perla, 1990, p. 303)
2. Artificialities
The fog of war cannot be fully duplicated; realistic
information is difficult to accurately represent in a wargame.
Typically the players have too much information and of too
high quality. Realistic provision for chaos, unanticipated
successes and failures, "someone who doesn't get the word" and
a commander not knowing what is happening elsewhere in the
battle are difficult to represent in a wargame.
Communication circuits as represented in a wargame
usually perform too well. Message text and voice
intelligibility are always good. There are no communication
outages, and transmissions and delivery are much faster than
in reality.
Combat results can be modified by the game controllers
to continue the game. An example would be to not allow all
Blue carriers and flagships to be eliminated by the first Red
strike, so Blue can continue to play. If this happens, the
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combat results cannot be used to assess strategy and tactics
used by either side.
During the game play, the participants can become
intensely involved but because the game is limited to work day
hours with breaks for lunch, the combat stress is reduced.
Also when the game breaks occur, the participants have an
opportunity to review their situation. This assessment time
would probably not be available in a similar real world
situation.
Each player approaches the game with a preconceived
mental model of the world and will act based on their previous
experience and knowledge. This is called framing. The
information presented during the game is processed by this
internal model. Because it contains a set of filters and
sorting and weighing factors, not all the information is
accepted. When a player makes a decision, the alternatives
considered fit within their mental model. Therefore, the
solutions for the player to choose from have been internally
limited.
Combat, fear, danger, losses and the unexpected are
missing from a wargame. Morale, leadership, fatigue, and
courage can be added to the list of factors that have an
important effect on the outcome of a situation, but which
cannot be predicted or measured. An example is whether a unit
will stand and fight or break. The will to fight is not
quantifiable or even understood.
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Admiral Arleigh A. Burke put his finger on the central
artificiality of wargaming when he said that "nobody can
actually duplicate the strain that a commander is under in
making a decision during combat." In a wargame, real
forces do not deploy, real weapons do not engage, and real
people do not die (Perla, 1990, p. 250).
These elements are usually handled by assuming parity or
equality for opposing forces.
An additional artificiality is the assumed homogeneity
of similar forces such as all pilots are equally skilled and
all guns and missiles of the same type work equally
effectively. These simplifications are necessary for game
playability.
The certainty that at some point the confrontation
will escalate into warfare is a built in unnatural condition
that affects the players' perception of the situation and
their decisions. In a real world confrontation, the option of
a diplomatic solution exists. As a result, the game
commanders are less troubled by the possibility that their
actions will precipitate a conflict that otherwise would have
been avoidable, and tend to be more aggressive than they might
be in a real world confrontation (Ketron, Inc., 1979, p. 23).
3. Data Validation
Data validation is a measure of how much confidence
there is in the data for a given model. Many times for
complex and difficult games, some of the real world data is
not available. An example is a wargame concerning the
benefits of using a new system in combat when it has not been
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implemented or tested in the real world. Also the data can be
unavailable because the system for the model has not yet been
built. This is a "catch 22" predicament because a lack of
real world data for complex and difficult situations can be
precisely why they are wargamed.
4. Workable Falsehoods
To create a functioning wargame, the designer must
apply some basic assumptions. In reality these assumptions
are incorrect, but they are minor falsehoods that the designer
and researcher can manage to deal with.
a. The Right Variables Have Been Selected
That the right variables have been selected is the
first assumption. A close examination of the hypothesis and
issues will identify a large number of variables. A good
workable model will not be able to address all of the
variables. It will only be able to deal with the set of
variables that are high priority and only a few if any of the
remaining variables.
b. A "Matched Set" Relationship Exists Between the
Algorithm and the Data Base
The algorithm for processing data can only work as
well as the quality of the data and vice versa.
For best matching, both components should be at a
comparable level of acceptable perfection. .. .An upper
bound than on the fidelity of the algorithm would that it
track the variables to no greater degree of granularity
than that expected in the data base. (Patton, 1990, pp.
43-44)
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c. The Study of War Can Approximate an Exact Science
Technology has advanced the art of wargaming and
reduced in degree many limitations. There is one limitation,
however that technology cannot impact. A person is unable to
predict how they or any other individual will react in
stressful and dangerous situations of war. This inability to
predict human action and reaction is a major problem and a
fundamental reason why the social sciences are generally less
exact than physical sciences (Hausrath, 1971, p. 276).
d. The Doctrine for Tactics and Data Used for the
Wargame Design is Current
The rapid advances of technology which produces
new or improved weapons and systems contributes to doctrine
evolution and input data change. Continuous revision of
doctrine and data used in a wargame ' s design is not practical.
Between periodic updates to reflect revised doctrine and data,
a wargame will be out of date.
e. A Wargame is Repeatable
In every human-decision game, the players learn
from experience. Therefore with each additional run of the
game, the players have knowledge that they did not have in the
previous game and this will affect their decisions. It is
still useful to repeat a wargame to confirm the consistency of
results or the lack of consistency. In general the
reliability, validity, and applicability of the results of
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reliability, validity, and applicability of the results of
human-decision games are more a matter of judgment than of
measurement (Hausrath, 1971, p. 287). In addition, if a
stochastic method of determining the outcome of chance events
is used, the same decision can result in a different outcome.
5. Cost
The four massive requirements of data, time, staff and
computer support add up to big costs. Although a wargame is
less expensive than a fleet exercise, the preparation, conduct
and evaluation time for a wargame should not be
underestimated. Pregame planning and postgame analysis can
require several months of work. Player training and playing
time takes them away from their jobs.
6. Stochastic vs. Deterministic
A simplistic description of the issue is whether it is
more important to obtain expected results (firing 200
things each having a probability of kill of 0.5 will cause
100 kills); or whether it is more important to allow for
all possible outcomes (firing 200 things as above could
cause 100 kills, or 200, or zero etc.). (Patton, 1990, p.
44)
Some designers believe that a game will be more
realistic if chance is portrayed stochastically so the players
will be forced to consider unexpected and unusual outcomes.
The opposing argument is that for a game's very finite set of
encounters an outcome from the tails of the distribution could
easily skew the game results.
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B. HAZARDS
The following is a list of wargaming considerations that
are hazardous to the accurate results of game play. The
researcher must anticipate and be vigilant to avoid these
conditions when selecting a game, when the game is played and
when representing conclusions.
1 . Poor Documentation
The history of modeling shows that poor documentation
creates poor results. Modeling documentation is critical when
determining appropriate applications. The ongoing process of
wargame revision can make the initial documentation obsolete.
In addition, personnel turnovers deplete the corporate
knowledge base concerning details and assumptions in models
used (Airpower Research Institute, 1985, p. 35).
2 . Uncooperative Players and Umpires
A wargame is a competitive situation. The players
bring their egos to the game and don't like to lose. They
have pride and some will improvise.
In order for the game to be successful, the players
must play wholeheartedly and enter into the spirit of the
game. There may be times in the game when a player is not
busy and may become bored. Another tendency is for some
players to "fight the problem" by seeing only the limitations
of the game models and not the advantages. A weapon may not
perform "correctly" or an outcome may not be what they expected.
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Umpires sometimes have to apply subjective values
judgments in determining an outcome and abuses can occur.
Umpires can limit the information they give to players and
"muddy the waters" with false or inaccurate data. Umpires
can also be arbitrary and inconsistent in their handling
of such factors. Similarly, there is a strong tendency
for human umpires to lapse into reporting information in
game terms rather than real terms. (Perla, 1990, p. 304)
3 . Misplaced Advocacy
The results of wargaming are used to communicate and
convince. The inherent ambiguity of a not rigorously
quantifiable problem allows misinterpretation of wargame
results. Because assumptions and data input can be
manipulated, there is an opportunity to use the wargame to
produce a desired outcome. The designer of a game has great
power to inform or to manipulate (Perla, 1990, p. 182).
This chapter listed and described the limitations that
cannot be eliminated from wargaming to enable the reader to
understand the restrictions within which a wargame attempts to
approximate reality. It also provided a list of elements that
are dangerous to useful game results. The next chapter
contains a description of the steps in a general wargame
experiment plan.
27
IV. GENERAL EXPERIMENT PLAN
This chapter's aim is to provide a broad outline of and
guidelines for designing a wargame experiment to test a C3
hypothesis. The reader should be familiar with general
experimental design and analysis of variance. A one or two-
semester course in statistics would be sufficient.
Experiment credibility hinges on the approach used to plan
or design the experiment. A clearly defined approach helps to
ensure that the final product is appropriate. The statistical
design of an experiment is the process of planning the
experiment so that appropriate data will be collected. The
data is then analyzed by statistical methods resulting in
valid and objective conclusions. There are two considerations
to any experimental problem: the design of the experiment and
the statistical analysis of the data. They are related
because the method of analysis depends directly on the design.
The goal is a cost effective experiment that supports informed
decisions.
The process for planning an experiment includes the
following stages: conception, design, preparation, execution,
analysis and report. A looping cycle of refinement is likely
to occur when going from conception to design and from design
to preparation.
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The success of an experiment is measured by the degree to
which the experiment results answer the requested issues and
objectives, and the credibility of those results. A effective
experiment requires a team of militarily knowledgeable C3
personnel (User) and statisticians that are experienced in
experimental design (Analyst)
.
Although all of the six stages will be described, the
thesis is mainly concerned with the design and preparation
stages.
A. CONCEPTION
Recognition of and a statement of the problem is the first
step. This step includes going from the issues, to the
objectives and then to the response variables. The importance
of this stage cannot be overemphasized. The Users begin by
writing a detailed statement of the issues to be investigated
in the experiment. They next define a clear, unambiguous
description of the specific objectives of the experiment and
how they relate to the identified issues. Experiment
alternatives should flow from and support the objectives. A
clear statement of the assumptions is written.
Relevant measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of
performance (MOP) are determined and designed to provide the
decision-maker with either a quantitative or qualitative
assessment of the objectives. The environment and the threat
must be chosen because they influence software selection.
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Security considerations unique to the experiment are also
determined during this stage. The Analyst can assist in
helping to identify the experiment alternatives, assumptions
and write the hypothesis. The Analyst makes sure that there
is a clear linkage between the objective, alternative, and
hypothesis.
The Analyst will also assist the User in selecting the
independent variables. These factors may be either
quantitative or qualitative. How these factors are to be
controlled and measured is also considered. The levels of the
factors must also be chosen. The dependent/response variable,
how it will be measured, and the probable accuracy of those
measurements are also determined. The User and the Analyst
must be careful to be certain that the response to be measured
really provides information about the objective.
B. DESIGN
The focus at this step is to match the experiment
objectives with available simulation models, analysis tools,
data requirements, measures, hardware requirements, and
security. The detailed experiment plan should have complete
traceability back to the originating issues, objectives and
requirements
.
A key aspect is determining whether the issues and
objectives lead to a specific generic experiment category.
Some generic experiment types include: demonstration,
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optimization, comparison, evaluation, sensitivity and
prediction. Deciding the experiment type can assist in
writing the mathematical model for the experiment so that a
statistical analysis of the data may be performed. Also
included in this step is determining the order in which the
data will be collected and the method of randomization. The
number of replications to support the analysis is decided.
The number of subjects (player) , from what population they
will be obtained, and to what condition(s) each player will be
exposed are planned.
This thesis concentrates on the experiment design steps
that are unique to wargaming. Those steps are: designing the
scenario, providing a data base, and setting up the software
program.
1 . Scenario
The game begins by placing the players in a situation
that requires them to make decisions. The scenario or
situation sets the scene for player decisions and provides for
specific updates in the situation during the play. The
updates can alter or influence the developing situation and
can draw player responses to specific items of interest. By
defining the setting and scope of player decisions, scenarios
can direct the course of a game into either very narrow or
fairly broad channels, depending on the game's goals (Perla,
1990, pg. 204). The scenario can have a major influence on
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player decisions so the User needs to be sure that the
scenario allows the players enough decision-making flexibility
to let the game meet the objectives. In order to focus on
exploring the C3 factors and reasoning that affect specific
types of decisions, scenarios should allow players as much
freedom as possible in making decisions by minimizing
artificial restrictions.
The User needs to work closely with the scenario
designer. The designer must understand the experiment
objectives and how they are to be met in the game. By
identifying the kinds of player activities and decision-making
opportunities that are required to meet the game's objectives,
the designer can ensure that those activities and
opportunities can happen. The scenario writer structures the
flow of game play to allow the User's needs to be met but
without forcing the players to follow a rigid path. A
critical node in the flow of the game, at which a player's
decisions will lead inevitably down one or another of several
major alternative paths (to order a battle force into a fjord
or to hold it in the open ocean; to launch a strike
immediately or await the enemy's attack first), may be called
a decision point (Perla, 1990, pp. 208-209). These decision
points need to have enough detail so that players will have a
realistic range of alternatives, but the number of
alternatives needs to be manageable for analysis.
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A coherent scenario must be logically consistent and
tie together all the elements of the experiment including the
originating issues, objectives and requirements. Usually, it
must also be a believable possible view of reality from the
players perspective. The exception is when the objectives of
the experiment are important enough that the players are
willing to shelve disbelief to support exploration.
The User should review the scenario designer's
documentation including reasons behind choice of assumptions,
factors included or excluded from the scenario, the use of
particular sources of information, and any other decision.
Control personnel, players and analysts each have
their own perspective and requirements for information
concerning the scenario.
Control personnel need to understand the context of the
game and the prerogatives and limitations under which they
must operate. Players need the same information as
control personnel, but it should be constrained to reflect
their less-than-perfect knowledge of their game world.
Analysts need to know not only the full story of what and
why, the "ground truth," but also the story as told to
players and control, so that they may interpret the
effects of information constraints. Finally, the future
consumers of the game's issues must know not only the
context of the game, but also how to distinguish scenario
input from game-play output. (Perla, 1990, p. 211)
The User also needs to plan how to distribute the
scenario information to the game-control personnel, game
players, game analysts and report readers.
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2. Data Base
In addition to understanding the situation, the
players must have access to the game's data base. The data
base includes all the information that the players would
reasonably have access to in a real situation. The data base
of the game contains information about the capabilities and
number of forces, levels of logistics, and relative
likelihoods of the occurrence and outcome of interactions
between forces, and the physical or environmental conditions.
It also is the doctrine, tactics and procedures for the use of
the forces and equipments.
The data base links the scenario and the mechanics of
the game. It must provide all the inputs required to allow
the game's models to reproduce the qualitative scenario
conditions and to generate outcomes of interactions.
The data base provided to the players should be
tailored to their game role, to the types of decisions they
should be making, and to the types of information they need to
make those decisions (Perla, 1990, p. 212). Important data
need to be easy to find or require a minimum of calculations.
The players need enough information to be able to determine
what possible outcomes will result from the various decisions
they may make.
Some data is easily quantifiable and available such as
logistics input data, weapon and equipment performance that
have been experimentally field tested, and information
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available from records such as ship transit time. Some data
will be unavailable such as for weapons never used in combat
(tactical nuclear weapons). This data must be deducted or
extrapolated from related data or assumed to be within
reasonable limits.
Qualitative data for judgments of unit discipline and
morale, leadership of opposing commanders can be either
assumed equal for opposing teams or can be assigned quantified
values that represent different levels or degrees of these
qualities.
The C3 data base representation of doctrine, tactics
and procedures is difficult to include. They change over time
and sometimes are not well documented because they depend on
the commander and his own command structure. The command and
control data base should include the communication, EMCON,
surveillance, EW and OPCON matrix.
3. Software (Wargame)
When selecting the wargame, the User and the Analyst
must constantly evaluate how the experiment objectives
determined during the conception stage will be applied in the
game. This section lists and describes areas that the User
and Analyst will examine in designing the game. These
decisions form the game parameters. The software to use is




Every wargame has objectives. The objectives
determine the game's uses. For example, a game may be
conducted to provide decision-making experience at one or more
specified levels and types of command; another to provide
information and data concerning the employment of specific
forces or weapons systems, test an organization or
distribution system, or evaluate a type of operation or a
tactical doctrine (McHugh, 1966, p. 1-11). The game designer
should have clearly identified how and in what ways the game
could provide the type of experience needed to achieve its
objectives. The User needs to match as closely as possible
the experiment objectives with the game objectives.
b. Scope and Level
The selection of the scope and level for an
experiment follow directly from the specific experiment
objectives.
War games may range all the way from a contest between two
units of a single service to a simulated global conflict
involving coalitions of nations, the efforts of all
services, and the impact of conventional and nuclear
weapons on military forces and civilian economies. Games
may be tactical, strategical, or a mixture of both. Some
emphasize air operations; others, land or sea operations.
Geographically, games may embrace a limited area, a single
area of operations, or several areas of operations.
(McHugh, 1966, p. 1-13)
Related to the scope of a game is the range of command levels.
Command levels can range from individual unit commanders to
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national leaders. The scope and range of command levels help
to determine the basic military units that will be used in the
game. If the lowest command level of naval forces is the
squadron, then the smallest unit might be the division.
c. Number of Sides
Games can be one-, two-, and n- or multi-sided.
A one-sided game is played under two or more different
situations. Some examples are: to find the minimum time for
the simulation of a replenishment operation when there is no
opposition from the enemy; and when the players are opposed by
the game controllers or a pre-programmed opponent. The most
common wargame is the two-sided with teams of players
representing each of the two major contending parties or
coalitions (Blue vs Red) . A multi-sided game is less common
and is most often used for diplomatic or political-military
games.
d. Amount of Intelligence
An "open" game is when all players have access to
complete information on each other's plans and forces.
Advantages to the open game are a reduction in personnel,
space and time requirements. A "closed" game is when the
players have access only to intelligence that would be
available in real-world conditions. The data generated in a
closed game will be more reliable if the simulated flow
information is incomplete or interrupted.
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A closed game with information handling
enhancements will make C3 experiments more credible. The best
approach for a wargame to take in information uncertainty is
to have more than one level of truth. Some information is
progressively disclosed automatically as the game progresses,
but more detailed and accurate information can be acquired by
aggressive sensor use, additional information requests, and
revealed by team members sharing their information. The fog
of war can be simulated by controlling the treatment of
information.
Ideally the game should allow each player to make the
following "mistakes": (1) Non-observation of entitles
which are within detection range because of non-alerted
operators, system failures, environment, and deception (or
loss of track after initial detection); (2) Incorrect
location of detected entities due to system bias, time
late, lack of gridlock, etc. (multiple tracks); (3)
Incorrect classification of detected entities due to
noise, jamming, environment, deception, failure to
correlate separate sources, delay, etc. (confusion of red,
blue and neutral); (4) Failure to report events.... In
addition to the errors of the above type, the gaming
system should introduce mistakes of the "false target"
type. These include radar, sonar and visual and ECM
sightings. (Sovereign, 1983, pp. 12-13)
All of the above can lead the decision maker to an incorrect
assessment of the tactical situation. By allowing the
mistakes to happen, C3 is more realistically represented.
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e. Methods of Evaluation
One method is called "free" umpiring and is
dependent on the experience, the judgment, and the objectivity
of the game controllers. An umpire can select from among a
broad range of realistic outcomes the one that is not only
probable, but that also furthers the purpose of the game
(McHugh, 1966, p. 1-18). The advantage is a quick and simple
method of evaluation.
Rigid umpiring rules are based on data that
reflect real-world interactions. Contacts, number of hits,
and the amount of damage are determined by equations and
computations performed manually or by computer.
Semirigid evaluation combines both free and rigid
techniques. Some situations are evaluated by qualified
officers and others are determined by equations.
f. How Time is Represented
Time is a critical aspect of any wargame for two
reasons.
First, in reality, timing and speed of execution are often
decisive in determining the success or failure of a
military operation. Second, time management in a game
very often determines the extent of activity that the game
can explore. (Perla, 1966, p. 222)
When a game progresses by predetermined and
constant intervals, it is a time-step game. Force movement is
conducted during the time interval and at the end of the
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interval, interactions are evaluated and the status of forces
is updated. For example, a game may define a single move to
represent an entire day's operations. The shorter the time
interval, the longer the time required for play.
Another approach to time-increment moves is to
vary the amounts of real time depending on the importance and
intensity of activity expected during a given time span.
For example, a pre-hostilities move may encompass ten to
fifteen days of activity. The D-day move of the same game
may represent just a single day. (Perla, 1990, p. 224)
The time interval for various moves may be predetermined in
game design or may be defined by the game controllers during
the game.
A critical event or event store game advances play
from event to event.
Another method is continuous time. Player
decisions may be made at any time and the orders and force
attempts to execute those orders are continuous. Continuous
time is closer to reality and is more likely to encourage
dynamic interactions that occur in real operations. The game
may be played faster, at the same rate, or slower than real
time. However, when the game-time to real-time ratio is not
one-to-one, there is a potential for distortion in the
planning process. When the game is speeded up, planning time
is reduced (uses too much game time) and when the game is
slowed, decision time pressure is unrealistically reduced.
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g. Method for Treating Chance Events
Since chance events occur in real war, a wargame
must be designed to deal with the probability that particular
conditions will occur and to the variety of possible effects
that will result from a given set of actions. Two ships may
be adversaries. Which ship will fire first? Which ship will
get the first hit? Will the first hit inflict little damage,
cripple or sink the ship? What will happen to the opposing
ship in the meantime? This example of a simple action has a
whole set of probabilities or chance outcomes. For many
events, the probabilities have been determined from war,
exercises and test data. When the data is not available,
best-estimate values are made by qualified experts. Wargames
must attempt to duplicate this complex of elements and factors
that may occur in almost infinite variety in real war
(Hausrath, 1971, p. 285).
There are two types of game uncertainties:
stochastic and deterministic. Stochastic uncertainties are
often characterized as the "roll of the dice", have a
probability distribution and use random numbers.
Deterministic uncertainties have a known set of inputs which
result in a unique set of outputs, and the probabilities of
the occurrence is an average or expected value. Each model
will usually require a combination of the two types of
uncertainties and their correct application is critical.
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Because many assessments are based on chance
factors, the Analyst should carefully evaluate the reliability
of results by first performing a sensitivity analysis.
Wide deviations may occur within the data from which
average or best-estimate values are derived. The ranges
of variation of these values, within which the results
will remain valid, i.e., within which the values can vary
without changing the nature of the result, are determined
by sensitivity analysis. .. .Sensitivity analysis does not
correct the data or assumptions used; it does give the
analyst some measure of the level of confidence that can
or should be associated with derived findings or results.
(Hausrath, 1971, p. 284)
h. Models
As defined in Chapter I, a model can be a
description of a system, a process, or a series of related
events. The macro model of a wargame is a complex
configuration of micro models and an explanation or
description of their interrelationships. The most common
micro models for wargames are weapons, logistics, command and
control, intelligence, communications, physical environment,
and sensors. During game play, the models can be programmed
to calculate decision results.
If the scenario sets the stage for the game, and the data
base provides the information required for players to make
decisions, the game's mechanics allow those decisions to
be implemented and inform the players about their effects.
Wargame mechanics may be considered as two interrelated
systems: models and procedures. The models translate data
and decisions into game events. Procedures define in game
terms what players can and cannot do and why, sequence the
game events to allow for accurate recreation of cause and
effect, and manage the flow of information to and from
players and control. (Perla, 1990, p. 214)
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All models should be documented so the User can understand the
assumptions and algorithms contained within the model design.
A definition of the C3 model's function is to
plan, direct, coordinate, and control assigned and attached
forces to accomplish a mission. Many C3 models accomplish
this function by using a combination of humans controlling the
higher echelon decisions and computer generated decisions at
lower levels. Command and control processes require the use
of the communication model and often act on information from
the intelligence and sensor models. Command and control
processes normally include orders to subordinates, queries to
superiors and subordinates for information, and an information
flow to update superiors and subordinates.
Basic C3 models include the following entities
with their attributes:
• C2 units: location; type of combat unit representative of
this headquarters unit; lower echelon units under the
direction of this unit; description of the echelon that
the headquarters represents; its nationality and its
vulnerability to various kinds of attack
• personnel: authorized quantity; on-hand quantity; fraction
of the on-hand quantity available for duty; a factor
representing a fatigue coefficient; and a capability
factor
• communications: its own organic communications facilities;
access to communications facilities; or have a combination
of both
• facilities: size, vulnerability, mobility, level of
capability (to determine response time), and capacity
(National Defense University, 1987, p. II-4).
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These entities and their functions require the support of all
the other models and need a direct or indirect interface.
i. Validation and Verification Considerations
Validation is a measure of how much confidence
there is on the output of a given model. There are two
approaches for validation. The first approach evaluates the
input data, the basic principles of the model and its
assumptions. The second method collects real world
information and compares it with the output of the wargame.
One of the most important duties of the User and Analyst team
is to determine the validity of the game's results and
processes.
The validity of a game's results can best be thought of as
the extent to which those results reflect reality as
opposed to the artificiality of the gaming environment.
This validity depends on the accuracy of the mathematical
evaluations of operational capabilities used in the models
of the game, and on how well the quantity and quality of
information available to the players of the game reflect
the levels of information likely to be available to their
real-life counterparts. (Perla, 1990, p. 236)
Assumptions and input data need to be carefully
examined. The results can be no better than the validity of
the data and the assumptions from which they are derived.
The User also needs to understand the quality or
utility of both the macro and micro models. This is
verification: is the model working as advertised. In the
course of game play, are the experiences and insights the
44
players may gain from it determined primarily by the game's
scenarios, assumptions, and mathematical combat models, or by
the decisions that the players are capable of making. When
the game is dominated by its mechanics instead of the
decisions choices, misconceptions and errors in understanding
can result. Player decisions cannot be driven from scenario
mandates and constraints. An example of a player decision
choice constrained by the scenario is assigning a mission to
deter war in a crisis but mandating all the answers to the
strategic questions. The key to creating accurate models and
systems, then, lies in the ability of the design to
incorporate as many of the elements important to actual
decision makers as possible while simultaneously minimizing
the number and effect of extraneous factors (Perla, 1990, p.
242) .
In addition to reviewing the model developer's
test plan and results, the users manual, the algorithm
document including where they came from or how they were
derived, the User can run tests and verify that the overall
game model will work for their experiment.
4. Support System Capability Requirements
The capabilities of a wargaming support system should
be considered. The system should have a wide range of
capabilities including:
• Multiple simultaneous users
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• Multiple interactive consoles
• File management for large data bases
• Security for file access.
• Graphic displays
• Recording and replay
This list should be considered as a minimum and additions will
be dictated by the experiment plan.
C. PREPARATION
1. Schedule
A final schedule of experiment activities should not
be established until all aspects of conception and design have
been determined. Time must be planned for writing the
scenario, gathering and in-putting the data, player training
pretesting, running the experiment and reserving facilities
and hardware.
2. Players and Control Personnel
The number of players on a team and their decision
making levels need to be adequate to meet the experiment/game
objectives. The player roles need to be consistent with the
geographic and operational scope and scale of the game. Each
player needs to have a well-defined operational role and must
understand their function within the group. Players in the
roles of non-U. S. or threat roles may need special training or
expertise. They must not only understand the technical
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capabilities of their foreign weapons but also the tactical
and strategic doctrine of the opposition.
Command levels above and below the team level may be
assumed by the game controllers. At this stage, the players
and control personnel are identified and matched to the
functions to be performed to conduct the game.
Player and control personnel training and
indoctrination are performed at this time.
3 . Forms and Game Directives
The special data-recording forms and work sheets must
be designed for the experiment and duplicated. The game
directives, scenario, order-of-battle information and other
materials used as preliminary information handouts to players
need to be prepared and duplicated.
4. Playtest
Playtesting is the best way to validate the entire
game system by verifying that all the micro models mesh
together to form a workable macro model. As the word implies,
playtesting combines playing the game by thoroughly testing
its functions and its ability to meet its objectives (Perla,
1990, p. 242). To ensure that the game design is complete and
that all data and procedures needed are available and correct,
the Analyst thoroughly tries out the various alternatives and
attempts to make the game fail.
Especially important is the system's response to unusual,
unexpected, or extreme decisions players may make. This
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is especially important for system games, particularly
those controlled by computer, in which the stabilizing
influence of a human umpire is missing. The player that
'cracks the code' of the game may play the game very
successfully, but the educational value of his experience
and the operational insights to be obtained from his
decision making may be nonexistent because he is only
taking advantage of a loophole that exists in the game
system but would not exist in reality. (Perla, 1990, p.
234)
This testing process enables the User to correct problems with
the system, procedures, or data before the experiment begins.
Preplaying also gives the game controllers an opportunity to




This is the actual game playing and data collection
process. In a two-sided game, each team makes the decisions
and perform actions appropriate to their mission. The
movements, actions, and interactions are recorded by the
computer. The game controllers have three functions. First
is to monitor the actions of the teams and to enforce the
rules of the game. Second is to evaluate the interactions
following the methods and data of the game and the third
function is to answer queries from the teams with the
information and intelligence that are appropriate. The cycle
for each team and controller interaction is: team decision -
team action - controller monitor - controller evaluate -
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controller inform. The game controllers need apply the rules
in as uniform an experimental environment as possible for each
game run
.
It is very useful to conclude the experiment by requesting
an overall assessment of the game and for specific comments




Experiment data was generated in various formats,
quantities and data rates. In accordance with the objectives
of the game, the data generated in the play of the game will
be sorted, compiled, and the results interpreted. A number of
different analytical techniques may be used and were selected
in the conception stage. In this step, the Analysts apply the
chosen methods of data analysis to the experiment data.
F . REPORT
There are three common report formats of which the User
may request any or all. The first report is a quick look. It
is written as soon as possible after the experiment and
summarizes the actual conduct of the experiment as compared to
the planned procedures. This report also advises as to
whether the information gained will be applicable to the
issues and objectives of the experiment and any possible
problems anticipated in performing the data analysis.
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A preliminary report can be provided no later than two
weeks after experiment completion. It supplies more detail
concerning the information provided in the quick look report.
Benefits of the preliminary report include a preview of the
format and completeness of the final report so the User can
provide an opinion.
The final report includes an assessment of whether or not
the objectives of the experiment were accomplished and the
conclusions. It can include an appraisal of the credibility
of the experiment, recommendations for follow-on analyses of
the data and follow-on experiments to more fully examine the
experiment and/or spin-off issues, and lessons learned
concerning the experimental processes, resources used, and
design and analysis techniques.
This chapter described the stages of the process for
planning an experiment using wargaming. It concentrated on
the experiment design steps that are unique to wargaming:
designing the scenario, providing the data base, and setting
up the software program. It is followed by an example of a C3
experiment which was planned to evaluate a decision aid. A
description of this experiment provides an opportunity for the




This chapter's intent is first to provide the reader with
an example of an actual C3 experiment by summarizing the
report into the following stages: conception, design,
preparation/execution, analysis and report. Then a list of
evaluation questions and answers is given for appraising the
example experiment plan. Although very little information
concerning the wargame is provided in the report, a list of
questions for a wargame critique is also provided.
This C3 experiment investigates the effects of introducing
a decision aid into a headquarters, and was conducted for the
Defense Communications Agency (DCA) and the Naval Ocean
Systems Center (NOSC) by ALPHATECH, Inc. The objective of the
experiment was to learn how the Naval-Based Replanning System
(N-KRS), a decision aid for planning Naval air strikes from
aircraft carriers against land targets, can best support the
strike planning process. The experiment used the tactical
naval warfare simulation designated Research, Evaluation, and
System Analysis (RESA) and which is located at the wargaming
facility at NOSC.
The Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool (HEAT) was
applied in this experiment to validate defensible conclusions.
The HEAT measurement tool consists of a set of variables
(effectiveness measures) and a rigorous set of methods and
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procedures for applying the measures to experiments and for
analyzing the results. HEAT measures fall into three broad
categories; process, performance/ and effectiveness. The
measures are based on a theory of headquarters decision making
operating in the following cycle: gathering information,
assessing the situation, generating decision options,
predicting the outcomes of each option, selecting a response,
executing the response, monitoring its outcome and then
repeating. The HEAT methodology was originally developed for
DCA eight years ago to understand the headquarters planning
process. The experiment described here extended the use of
HEAT to examine the decision making issues associated with the
introduction of a decision aid to support planning in a
headquarters environment (ALPHATECH, Inc., 1989, pp. 1-2).
This chapter is a summary of the experimental report prepared
by ALPHATECH, Inc. The information presented is typical of
the data available after an experiment.
A. CONCEPTION
Recognition of and a statement of the problem is the first
step. A detailed statement of the issues to be investigated
in the experiment is written.
1. Navy Air Strike Planning Problem
The purpose of Navy air strike planning is to achieve
a mission goal while satisfying a number of resource
constraints. Tradeoffs exist between weapon effectiveness,
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weapon availability, aircraft capability, aircraft
availability, fuel requirements, and other factors. The air
strike planner may receive guidance from higher authority on
the target priorities. In the experiment, the players were
given a desired probability of a kill (Pk) for the targets to
indicate the priority of the target, with a higher Pk
indicating a higher priority. This is an example of an aspect
of the experiment design which did not follow reality.
A typical planning process (as observed in the experiment)
starts by considering the nature of the target and the
desired Pk, and calculating the bombs required to achieve
that Pk ( weaponeering) . The aircraft needed/available to
transport those bombs is then considered, and fuel
requirements for the bombing mission are calculated. The
aircraft needed for SAM suppression, fighter escort, and
jamming missions are considered, and total fuel
requirements are calculated. If the total fuel needed
exceeds the fuel available, then the planning process
recycles, with changes being made until the plan is
satisfactory. Planning is not necessarily done in this
sequence, however. The planning process can start with
any aspect of the strike as long as all of the relevant
factors are eventually considered. (ALPHATECH, Inc., 1989,
pp. 4-5).
A number of factors in the air strike planning process
were not included in the experiment. Examples are weather,
navigation overflight restrictions and launch sequencing.
2. Navy Knowledge-based Replanning System (N-KRS)
The N-KRS decision aid was produced by NOSC
specifically for Naval air strikes and was based on the KRS
strike planning decision aid developed by the Air Force. The
53
decision aid checks for consistency in air strike plans and
tracks resource availability and resource use.
N-KRS allows the planner to specify the goals of an air
strike and then suggests a resource allocation to meet
those goals within the constraints of the resources
available. The user interface is in the form of a
"template" with 9 primary "slots." The values assigned to
these slots constitute the strike plan. The user may
specify values for any number of the 9 slots. N-KRS can
function in a fully automated mode, in which the user
specifies only the target for the strike and N-KRS fills
in all of the remaining slot values based on available
resources and a knowledge base of planning rules. It can
also function in a fully interactive mode, in which the
user specifies values for all 9 slots, and the decision
aid merely verifies that the plan is consistent and does
not violate resource constraints. (ALPHATECH, Inc., 1989,
p. 9)
N-KRS recognizes a number of different mission types.
The relevant types for the experiment were Power Projection
Air (PPA) missions (bombing missions), SAM Suppression
missions, Air Escort missions, electronic countermeasures
(ECM) , and refueling. The following slots in the N-KRS user
interface were used: target, Pk, ordnance, aircraft, AC
number, carrier, unit (squadron), time of launch and time over
target.
3. Experiment Objectives
The experiment had three primary objectives:
1. Evaluate the value of the N-KRS decision aid for Naval
air strike planning. Specific relevant questions are:




(b) How does the N-KRS assist the air strike planner? -
reduce workload, - reduce time, - reduce errors, - allow
more option consideration, - allow more recent information
incorporation
.
2. Demonstrate the N-KRS decision aid to experienced air
strike planners and obtain feedback on potential
applications and areas for improvement.
3. Apply and improve the HEAT methodology for collecting
observational data on a commander's decision making
processes and linking process measures to outcome measures.
Add to database of results within the HEAT framework.
(ALPHATECH, Inc., 1989, p. 2)




The objective of the experiment was to compare air
strike planning with and without the N-KRS to learn how the
decision aid can best support air strike planning. In the
experiment, four players prepared air strike plans with and
without N-KRS, and their strike plans were simulated using the
RESA wargame. Data on aircraft lost during the strike and
damage to the targets were generated by RESA and provided to
the subjects for use in planning subsequent strikes
(ALPHATECH, Inc., 1989, p. 12).
2 . Experiment Conditions
There were two major factors in the experiment: (1)
the presence or absence of the N-KRS decision aid. Each
factor had two levels: the difficulty of the scenario - easy
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or hard. The design was a two-by-two factorial with four
conditions; each player participated in all four conditions.
In order to separate learning effects over time from the
effect of using the decision aid, two of the players began the
experiment in the manual condition and two began by using the
decision aid (ALPHATECH, Inc., 1989, p. 12).
For the easy scenario, initial planning was based on
the player's assessment of the resources needed for the
mission. After the simulation was completed, the player
planned a second wave and had to take into account battle
damage assessment and any losses of aircraft due to an enemy
counterattack before the second launch. The difficult
scenario was the same; except in planning the second attack,
the player had to consider that the enemy had moved a number
of its aircraft away from the target base. Also, the enemy
counterattack on the carrier group used more resources than in
the easy scenario. Additionally, the players planned a third
strike that required them to assess the aircraft available
from the first strike (taking losses into account) and the
battle damage from the second strike. The third strike was
not played out in RESA.
Players in the experiment planned an air strike
against three enemy air bases, using the resources of three
Navy aircraft carriers. The mission was to destroy the enemy
aircraft parked on ramps at the bases and to destroy aviation
fuel stores at each base. At the beginning of each session,
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the players were given background briefing materials that
listed all of the assets available for the strike, the enemy
order of battle at each of the targeted bases (intel), and the
desired probability of kill (Pk) for each target. Their
assets included five types of aircraft and three types of
weapons. The briefing materials instructed the subjects to
plan the strike in two waves, with the first wave hitting two
specified bases, and the second wave hitting the third base
together with a possible restrike of the lesser damaged base
from the first wave (ALPHATECH, Inc., 1989, p. 4).
3. Hypotheses
The major independent variables are the presence of
the decision aid and the difficulty of the planning task. The
dependent variables were divided into process measures and
outcome measures. The process measures are situation
assessment accuracy, planning errors, information sought from
intel, time to complete plan, workload, and outcome prediction
accuracy. The outcome measure is the success of the air
strike. The goal of the analysis was to understand the effect
of the independent variables on outcomes by analyzing their
effects on the processes underlying those outcomes (ALPHATECH,
Inc. , 1989, p. 19)
.




• The decision aid will reduce the time needed to plan or
replan an air strike.
• Commanders will take advantage of the reduction in the
time needed to plan to seek more current information about
their own or the enemy's situation.
• In the more difficult planning condition, time-to-plan
will be longer, and the commander's subjective workload
assessment will be higher.
• The decision aid will reduce the commander's subjective
workload during planning.
• Commanders will show more proactive information seeking
under conditions of lower subjective workload.
• Proactive information seeking will lead to more accurate
enemy situation assessment.
• More accurate enemy situation assessment will lead to more
accurate evaluation of the expected effectiveness of the
plan (option) selected. The accuracy of situation
assessment and effectiveness evaluation will contribute to
achievement of the strike goal.
• The use of the decision aid will result in a plan with
greater internal consistency (fewer errors made during
planning)
.
• Fewer planning errors will result in better strike
outcomes (achievement of strike goal).
• The effect of the decision aid will be greater in the
difficult planning condition. (ALPHATECH, Inc., 1989, pp.
19-20.
4. Scenarios
In the experiment, all of the scenarios involved a
two-wave air strike against three enemy bases. The overall
goal of the strikes was to neutralize the air threat at these
bases. The mission was the same for all four sessions, and
was provided to each player before each session in written
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briefs. Three available Navy aircraft carriers were located
approximately 600 miles from the enemy bases. The enemy bases
had air defenses in all scenarios, and Blue usually lost some
aircraft in each wave. The wargame did not support Blue
maneuvering to avoid the enemy air defenses, but Blue could
send a SAM suppression mission as a part of each strike.
5. Amount of Intelligence
Initial intelligence information provided the enemy
order of battle at each of the targeted bases. Intelligence
reports gave battle damage assessment information within 15
minutes after each strike (another falsehood) . The subjects
could request additional intelligence reports from "national
sensors" and did get them. The HEAT observer noted the time
the commander made the request and instructed the RESA
controller to provide the information after a delay of 10-15
minutes (another falsehood) . The requested reports provided
additional battle damage assessments and estimates of enemy
aircraft remaining at each base. The intelligence reports
were based on ground truth but were not totally accurate.
6. How Time is Represented
Each experiment sessions lasted approximately three
hours and twenty minutes. First, the player was given an
opportunity to develop or change an initial plan at a time
rate of 1-to-l. The strike was launched when the plan was
completed, and RESA was accelerated to run at 6-to-l rate.
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After the launch, the planes took about 30 minutes (clock
time) to reach their targets. Battle damage and attrition
information was available in 15 minutes. The player was given
an opportunity to replan based on the new information, and
RESA was slowed to run at 1-to-l. After the second launch,
the game resumed a 6-to-l rate, and RESA played the air strike
to produce a final set of outcome data.
C. PREPARATION\EXECUTION
1. Players and Control Personnel
Four experienced air strike planners participated as
players. Two of the players came from the carrier Carl Vinson
and had been active in air strike planning. The other two
players were experienced but not currently assigned to air
strike planning duties. The following describes the personnel
set for the decision aid condition followed by the non-
decision aid condition.
The Blue RESA operator and the Controller/enemy commander
were RESA lab staff. The N-KRS operator was a NOSC staff
member involved in developing the decision aid. As
replanning occurred, a strike file was created off-line
for entry into RESA (this allowed an interface between N-
KRS and RESA to occur with a negligible time delay) ; the
operator handling this function was provided by NOSC. The
Blue player was positioned so that he could see the RESA
displays and talk with both the RESA operator and the N-
KRS operator. The HEAT observer was able to record the
interactions that occurred and to see the RESA and N-KRS
displays.
In the non-decision aid condition, the player provided
instructions for the creation of the off-line RESA strike
file. In this condition, the player was assisted by an
individual who did weaponeering calculations to compute
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probabilities of kill, and kept tallies of resources
available (ALPHATECH, Inc., 1989, p. 15).
2. Data Collection
Three types of data were collected during the
experiment:
• data collected by the HEAT observer recording the
interaction of the strike commander with the N-KRS
operator in the decision aid condition and the planning
assistant in the manual condition;
• questionnaires completed by the players;
• and strike outcome data from the RESA simulation.
Data collected by the HEAT observer included:
• time that any information was received;
• all actions taken to obtain additional information,
including the time of the action, the type of information
requested and received, and the time of arrival of the
requested information;
• all comments by the player about the certainty of incoming
information;
• for each piece of new information received, the time
replanning was initiated (if ever) in order to adjust the
plan for new information, and the time that replanning was
completed;
• the time and nature of all interactions regarding changes
to be made to the plan between the player and the N-KRS
operator or the planning assistant;
• all options for the air strike plan discussed by the
player;
• all verbal instructions given by the player to the RESA
interface operator;
61
• all comments by the player about the possible outcomes of
any air strike planning options being considered;
• all comments by the player about the plan's likelihood of
success;
• all comments by the player about best/worst case scenarios
for the plan's outcomes;
• planning errors noted and corrected (or not corrected),
including the time the error was noted, the type of error,
and the time the correction was initiated and completed;
• and all comments concerning the decision aid, including
ease or difficulty of use, features asked for that were
not provided, and errors or confusion on the players part
about the capabilities of the decision aid (ALPHATECH,
Inc., 1989, p. 17).
The players completed a set of questionnaires
following the launch of each strike. The first was a workload
questionnaire. The second was to assess situation assessment
accuracy including estimates of the expected number of targets
at each base (aircraft) and the confidence levels in those
estimates. The third questionnaire assessed option evaluation
accuracy and included estimates of the number or percentage of
targets expected to be destroyed at each base by the strike,
estimates of the number of Blue assets (planes) expected to be
lost and confidence levels for both estimates.
The data available from RESA was the outcome of each
air strike and on the enemy and friendly aircraft lost during
the strike. Data also included the movement of enemy aircraft
during the difficult scenarios which was used to calculate the




The following will serve as examples of the analysis. The
report also included analysis of the accuracy of estimated
strike effectiveness, planning errors, strike effectiveness
and situation assessment accuracy.
1 . Time Needed to Prepare Strike Plan
One of the primary hypothesis is that the decision aid
will save time for the air strike planner. The mean time
taken to prepare strike plans (in minutes) with and without N-
KRS for the easy and difficult experiment conditions were
computed. The planning times did not include time spent
adjusting available aircraft counts for aircraft lost in
strikes or destroyed when carriers were attacked. An Analysis
of Variance (ANOVA) was also determined for the planning time.
Overall, N-KRS did reduce the time needed to produce a
strike plan; in the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for
planning time, the main effect of the decision aid was
significant at the .10 level. However, the effect of the
decision aid on planning time was concentrated in the
first wave of the strike. There was a significant
difference in the time taken to plan the first wave of the
strike with and without the decision aid (p<.10). In
contrast, the time taken to plan the second wave of the
strike was similar with and without the decision aid in
both the easy and difficult conditions. (ALPHATECH, Inc.,
1989, p. 21)
The analysis included studying whether the players
allocated their planning time to different activities when
using N-KRS. The HEAT decision making process provided a
framework for analyzing the planning and decision making
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activities affected by using N-KRS. In the experiment, the
functions most relevant to air strike planning are monitoring,
situation assessment, option generation and evaluation. For
the monitoring function, the analysts studied the frequency of
requests for additional intelligence information. All of the
interactions between the player and the N-KRS operator or the
planning assistant were recorded by the HEAT observer. For
the functions of situation assessment and option generation,
the recorded interactions were grouped into four decision
making activities. These activities were: enemy situation
assessment, option exploration, option evaluation, and
commands (option selection) . A table showing the distribution
was generated to show the mean percentages (the percentages of
interactions falling into each of the four categories for each
experiment session and these percentages were averaged across
subjects and across the easy/difficult conditions). An
example of the results was the total number of interactions
observed in the manual planning condition was much greater
(611) than in the decision aid condition (360), indicating
that more time was spent planning in the manual condition.
2. Accuracy of Enemy Situation Assessment
Before each wave of the strike was launched, the
players were asked to estimate how many aircraft they believed
would be at the enemy bases when the strike occurred.
The accuracy of enemy situation assessment was measured by
the absolute value of deviation between the estimates
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given by the subjects and the ground truth about the
number of enemy aircraft at each base, where a smaller
deviation indicates a more accurate estimate. .. .The mean
deviation was slightly smaller without the decision aid (a
mean error of 38.4 aircraft without the aid versus 51.8
aircraft with the aid) and the difference is not
statistically significant. The only significant
difference in enemy situation assessment accuracy was
between the easy and difficult conditions. (ALPHATECH,
Inc., 1989, p. 29)
E . REPORT
1. Organization
The experiment report contained six chapters titled:
Introduction, Navy Air Strike Planning, The N-KRS Decision
Aid, Experiment Concept and Design, Experiment Results,
Implications for Improving N-KRS and HEAT and Conclusions. It
contained charts, figures, tables and diagrams. The appendix
included subject briefing materials, questionnaires and data
collection forms and a correlation matrix. The Experiment






• Experiment Set-up and Personnel;
• Subjects;
• and Data Collection.
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2 . Results
The report overview of the results is summarized as
follows:
The experiment results suggest that the strike planners in
the experiment were able to develop equally effective
plans with and without the N-KRS aid. The major advantage
of the aid was that it saved time and prevented
errors....As expected, the use of the N-KRS decision aid
was negatively related to planning time, subjective
workload, and planning time, subjective workload, and
planning errors. Contrary to expectation, it had little
effect on information seeking, and little effect on the
accuracy of planner's assessment of the enemy
situation. . . .Few of the process measures in the experiment
had any relationship to the overall effectiveness of the
strike, as measured by the number of enemy aircraft
destroyed. (ALPHATECH, Inc., 1989, pp. 37-38)
The report provided a figure which summarized the correlations
that were found between the variables in the experiment. The
figure used solid lines to indicate Pearson correlations with
a significance level (two-sided) of at least p<.15. Dotted
lines were used to show expected relationships that the data
did not support. A full correlation matrix was available in
the report appendix.
3. Conclusions
The following paragraph contains excerpts from the
report's summary of conclusions.
Subjects in the experiment were able to prepare equally
feasible and effective air strike plans with and without
the N-KRS decision aid, but they prepared these plans more
quickly and with fewer errors when N-KRS was used.... Use
of the N-KRS aid altered the process by which the subjects
produced their strike plans.... In interpreting these
results, it is important to note that the planners in the
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experiment were probably not yet as thoroughly familiar
with the N-KRS as they would be after weeks or months of
experience in using it ... .Subjects ' estimates of the
expected effectiveness of the strike were less accurate
when they used N-KRS. .. .Subjects in the experiment often
commented that they would have liked N-KRS to show then in
a compact, summary format what weapons and aircraft were
available for the entire task force. (A1PHATECH, 1989,
pp. 45-46)
F. CRITIQUE
There must be a clear connection between the objective,
alternative, and hypotheses. The experiment design and
analytical plan continue this link. Finally, the conclusions
should be about the alternatives and be based on the positive
or negative analysis results concerning the hypothesis. The
experiment report needs to make all these linkages apparent.
The experiment report prepared by ALPHATECH, Inc. is a good
example. The following questions can be used effectively to
evaluate C3 experiments. The author has included a response
pertaining to the N-KRS experiment.
The objectives need to be clear and relevant, the
assumptions reasonable, and the hypotheses germane.
• Was a decision identified which requires answering now?
Yes. The N-KRS is a working decision aid.
• Was the real issue directly addressed? Yes. The real
issue was how the N-KRS could best support the strike
planning process.
• What question was the analysis designed to answer? The
primary question was: Does the N-KRS have a measurable
effect on the air strike outcomes? The secondary question
was: How does the N-KRS assist the air strike planner?
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• Could the issue be settled by an answer to the question?
Yes if both questions are answered because the second
question concerns the process.
The experimental design should find a balance between being
comprehensive and executable. The measures need to be
discriminatory and quantifiable; and the data replicable.
• Were all major factors effecting the question included?
Yes, the factors were the presence or absence of the N-KRS
decision aid.
• Were sufficient levels of the factors identified? Yes,
there were two levels for the difficulty of the scenario:
easy and hard.
• Do the scenarios match the issue and the question? Yes.
• Is the scope of the system being considered adequate? Yes.
• Were forces and weapons correctly included? Yes.
• Does the operational concept reflect real doctrine and
tactics? Yes, except for using the Pk factor in strike
planning to indicate target priority and the intel
availability.
• Are standard operating procedures followed? The report
did not contain this information.
• Was the experiment adequately trained and staffed? The
background and experience level was appropriate for the
participants. The report only says that player training
in the use of the decision aid was limited.
• Were the supporting models matched in level with the
issue? No information given.
• Were supporting models credible? The only model described
in the report was the intel model and it was not credible.
• Were high level measures used (MOFE and MOE rather than
MOP)? No.
• Do the measures succinctly answer the question? Yes.
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• Were both performance and vulnerability considered?
Vulnerability was not considered.
• Was a trial run performed? Information not given.
• Were extraneous factors like learning controlled? Yes,
two players began the experiment in the manual condition
and two began by using the decision aid.
• Were instruments adequate to measure variables? Yes and
a variety of data was collected.
The analysis must be correct and unbiased. The
conclusions supportable.
• Was the significance of each factor established? Yes.
• Did the analysis use standard procedures such as ANOVA?
Yes.
• Were the conclusions based on the results? Yes.
The experiment report does not provide information
concerning RESA, the wargame. The report does not contain any
information on the game data base, the method of gaming
evaluation, the method for treating chance events and RESA
validation considerations.
In addition to evaluating the experiment plan and
execution, the wargame itself needs to be examined.
Appropriate questions for wargame analysis include the
following list drawn from the appendix of The Art of Wargaming
by Per la.
These questions concern player preparation for
participation in the wargame.
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• What information was provided to participants prior to
their arrival?
• How are game objectives defined in preliminary briefings?
• What information is briefed to participants before play
begins?
• How and to what level of detail is the scenario described?
What is it?
It is important to have a widespread view and
understanding of the structure and style of the wargame.
• What is the overall game structure and style?
• Who are the players? Is there a team structure? From
what commands to team members and leaders come? What are
the names and real-world jobs of the principal players?
How many sides are there in the game (one, two, or many)?
What are the decision levels of the players, and how do
they communicate? What are the responsibilities and
limitations of the players, and how do these correspond to
their roles?
• What are the roles of control? How are command levels
above and below the players represented? How do players
and controllers/umpires communicate? What are
controller/umpire responsibilities, powers, limitations?
• What is the formal analysis plan?
Knowledge concerning the game execution is important in
critiquing a wargame.
• What data and displays are available to the players?
• During the course of play, what decisions are made by the
players, and which are left up to others (control,
umpires)? Are players' questions focused on what they
should do, what they can do, what they must do, what they
will do, or how can they do?
• How are game events defined? What do control and the
umpires not tell the players?
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How are events sequenced? What defines an activity? How
is game time controlled relative to real time?
How does battle-damage assessment (BDA) or event
resolution work? Who does BDA? What techniques, models,
data do they use and how?
As mentioned in Chapter III, the human element can be a
benefit or weakness of the wargame.
• What are player's feelings about their roles and ability
to influence events? What do the players see as the good
points and the problems of the process? What special
insights and ideas did the players bring to the game, and
how has the play of the game affected them?
• What are the attitudes of the controllers and umpires?
How do they feel about their role, and how well are they
carrying it out? Is there any source of disagreement?
This list is not comprehensive but will give the reader a
foundation for forming questions unique to an experiment.
This chapter summarizes a real C3 experiment that applied
wargaming to test the hypotheses and uses the principles from
the previous chapters to critique the example.
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VI . SUMMARY
Naval military professionals need to be able to
understand not only what wargaming can do, but also what it
cannot do. This thesis provides information about wargaming
to users who will apply conclusions derived from wargaming
data in decision making and users of wargaming as a research
tool for hypotheses testing. Game users need to understand
and be able to ask appropriate questions concerning the
process of using a wargame as an experiment tool.
The first chapter explains that wargame use in general is
rising due its ability to assist in evaluating combat
capabilities, system improvements and new technology that add
to the increasing complexity of warfare. Wargaming can
effectively be used for identifying requirements and
designing, developing, acquiring, training for and using major
C3 systems. Wargaming is particularly suited to exploring C3
issues because the game includes humans in decision making.
However, wargaming is not a perfect image of reality and is as
complex as the issues explored with it. Game data users need
to be aware of wargame limitations and hazardous wargame
issues. The goals of this thesis were (1) to enable the
reader to ask intelligent questions concerning a wargame
experiment before applying conclusions generated from wargame
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data, and (2) to enable anyone desiring to use a wargame as an
experimental tool to have a guide for the experiment plan.
The second chapter ensures that the reader understands
that a wargame employs human beings as decision makers and a
simulation uses programmed rules to generate machine
decisions. A wargame is not real, not duplicable and not
useful for predicting future outcomes. The best use of a game
is to investigate processes. Some general wargame
applications include: to explore not rigorously quantifiable
problems, to decompose complex problems, to uncover new
aspects of a problem, to test operational plans, to assist in
the planning process and to focus on human behavior.
Applications exploring aspects specific to C3 are command
roles, decision hypothesis formation, filtering and
interpretation of information and information categories used
in making requests. Types of wargames are defined by:
technique choice for applying rules (rigid or free) and
opponent force knowledge (open or closed), the purpose of the
game (educational, operational planning or research), and
geographic scope combined with the level of decision making
(global/strategic, theater/operational or local/tactical). A
list of common features unique to wargames includes: a
wargame simulates an actual or predicted real-life military
operation involving a clash of opposing forces; usually
represents at least two forces and provides a means for their
employment; follows accepted military rules and procedures;
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and provides a means for identifying and applying the
firepower of units and weapons. The basic requirements for
any wargame are qualified personnel, appropriate facilities
and equipment, a game manual which provides the rules, data
and procedures to be applied during the game, and a scenario
statement of the situation.
To avoid a reader misapplication of wargame data, the
nature of wargaming, its limitations and potential hazards
were discussed. The conflict between balancing reality and
complexity, and the artificialities such as too much high
quality information provided by communication circuits that
work too well, and data validation problems contribute to
wargame limitations. To facilitate game playability, the
following falsehoods are acceptable: assume that the right
variables have been selected for the experiment, that a
"matched set" relationship exists between the algorithm and
data base for the game, that the study of war can approximate
an exact science, that the game uses current tactics and
doctrine, and that a wargame is repeatable. Wargaming
considerations that are hazardous to the accurate results of
game play are poor documentation, uncooperative human players
and misplaced advocacy.
Chapter IV described a broad outline of and guidelines for
designing a wargame experiment. Experiment credibility hinges
on the approach used to plan the experiment. A clearly
defined approach is critical to ensure that the final product
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is appropriate for the accurate analysis of the experiment
results. The first step of the conception stage includes the
clear statement of the problem issues, objectives and response
variables. Identifying the experiment alternatives and
assumptions, writing the hypothesis, and selecting the
independent and dependent variables are also included in the
first step. The design stage matches the experiment
objectives with available simulation models, analysis tools,
data requirements, measures, hardware requirements and
security considerations. The detailed experiment plan should
have complete traceability to the originating problem and
issues. The design steps unique to wargaming are: composing
the scenario to allow player decision flexibility, tailoring
the data base to the game objectives and selecting the
software. When selecting the game, the game objectives, scope
and level, number of sides, amount of intelligence, methods of
evaluation, representation of time, method of treating chance
events, available models, game validation and verification,
and support system requirements all need to be evaluated so
the best possible matching of the game capabilities and
experiment requirements occurs. Experiment preparation
consists of establishing a schedule, selecting players and
control personnel, creating forms and game directives and
playtesting to validate the game system. During execution,
the game is played and data collected. Analysis of the data
precedes writing the report.
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The last chapter applies the principles from the previous
chapters to critique an example of an actual C3 experiment.
It summarized the N-KRS experiment report into the stages of
conception, design, preparation/execution, analysis and
report. An appraisal of the example experiment design, based
on the information contained in the report, was provided by
listing evaluation questions and answers. Very little
information about the wargame was given in the report so only
questions for a wargame critique was provided.
The author has provided a summary on wargaming and an
implementation guide for experimental wargaming. Although
wargaming is an art, the reader is now better prepared to
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